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In United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit overturned the in-
sider trading convictions of two hedge fund managers who received
material nonpublic information from public companies via an ex-
tended tipping chain. The Newman court interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC as requiring that the government
prove: (1) that the tippee knew that the tipper was disclosing the infor-
mation in exchange for a personal benefit; and (2) that if the personal
benefit does not involve a quid pro quo to the tipper, that the disclo-
sure arise from a "meaningfully close personal relationship" with the
recipient of the information. The U.S. Attorney and the SEC reacted
sharply to Newman, decrying it as a departure from Dirks. This essay
traces the "judicial history" of Dirks' personal benefit requirement.
Based on that history, I conclude that Newman's knowledge standard
is the correct reading of Dirks and that its requirement of a "meaning-
fully close personal relationship" is consistent with, if not compelled
by, the rule laid down in Dirks.
I. INTRODUCTION
T 'TED States v. Newman' is the most important insider trading
opinion since the Supreme Court upheld the misappropriation
Ltheory in United States v. O'Hagan.2 In Newman, the Second Cir-
cuit grappled with the elements required for a criminal insider trading
violation. The defendants in Newman were tippees who received material
non-public information from a chain of informants that ultimately led to
an insider.
The last word from the Supreme Court in the area of tipper-tippee lia-
bility is Dirks v. SEC, handed down in 1983. 3 The Dirks court, in an opin-
ion written by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., held that there was no
* Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I benefit-
ted from comments by Don Langevoort. I wish to acknowledge the generous support of
the William W. Cook Endowment of the University of Michigan.
1. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, - S. Ct. -, 2015 WL 4575840.
2. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
3. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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violation of Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act 4 absent a breach of fiduciary
duty by the insider-tipper in providing the information. A breach of fidu-
ciary duty, according to Dirks, required that the tipper receive "a mone-
tary or personal benefit for revealing [corporate] secrets" or have the
"purpose to make a gift of valuable information."' 5 Either would satisfy
the Dirks test: "whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been
no breach of duty to stockholders." '6 Absent a "direct or indirect personal
benefit from the disclosure," there could be no deception and, therefore,
no fraud under Rule 10b-5.7
The Newman court was required to interpret Dirks' personal benefit
standard in order to answer the question: what must tippees know about
the disclosure of non-public information by the tipping corporate insider
in order to sustain a conviction? The Newman court rejected the govern-
ment's argument-based on the Second Circuit's prior decision in SEC v.
Obus8-that it was sufficient that the tippee know that the information
has been revealed by the tipper in breach of a duty of confidentiality.
Instead, the Newman court held that "in order to sustain a conviction for
insider trading, the [g]overnment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed confidential information
and that he did so in exchange for a personal benefit."9 The court further
held that the government must prove that the personal benefit to the tip-
ping insider involved "a meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature ...
[T]his requires evidence of 'a relationship between the insider and the
recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to
benefit the [latter].' "10
The government's reaction to the Newman opinion was sharp, arguing
in its petition for rehearing that the decision was "flatly inconsistent with
Dirks" and that "its erroneous redefinition of the personal benefit re-
quirement will dramatically limit the government's ability to prosecute
some of the most common, culpable, and market-threatening forms of
insider trading."'" The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
chimed in with an amicus brief asserting that the decision was "directly at
odds" with Dirks and prior Second Circuit precedent.12 The Second Cir-
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
5. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
6. Id. at 662.
7. Id. at 667 n.27.
8. 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).
9. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014).
10. Id. at 452 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013).
11. Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc,
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837(L)), 2015 WL 1064423,
at *13, *3 (Jan. 23, 2015).
12. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
the Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc,
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cuit stood its ground, denying the motion for rehearing.
This Essay traces the genesis of the personal benefit test in Dirks. The
outcome of Dirks-an "easy case"-was never in doubt, but the standard
for tipper-tippee liability was nonetheless labored over by Justice Powell
and his clerk. Their goal was to find a clear principle to govern subse-
quent cases. The path that Powell took to overturning the SEC's sanction
in Dirks sheds light on the personal benefit issue faced by the Newman
court.13 I conclude that this "judicial history" is consistent with the New-
man Court's interpretation of the Dirks personal benefit test. Liability
under Rule 10b-5 requires the government to prove: (1) that the tipper
disclosed material non-public information for the purpose of acquiring an
indirect personal benefit by making a gift to the recipient, which requires
a relationship of some substance; and (2) that both the tipper and tippee
acted with scienter in breaching their duties.
II. DIRKS AND PERSONAL BENEFIT
The SEC censured Dirks, a securities analyst employed by a broker-
dealer, in an administrative proceeding. 14 Dirks informed his clients
about a massive fraud at Equity Funding that he learned of by interview-
ing current and former Equity Funding employees. Dirks' customers re-
lied on that information to sell Equity Funding shares before the
company's collapse. 15 According to the SEC, Dirks aided and abetted his
customer's violation of Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the SEC's conclusion that
Dirks' conduct violated Rule 10b-5. How did the Court reach that conclu-
sion? Justice Powell, who considered himself the Supreme Court's leader
in securities law, prepared a memorandum for the conference at which
the justices would decide Dirks.16 Powell's theory for the anti-tipping
standard turned on the tipper's purpose in disclosing the non-public in-
formation: Was that purpose consistent with the insider's fiduciary duty?
Powell explained to his colleagues:
We made an important point in Chiarella [v. United States].17 It did
not involve a tippee, but it did establish that liability cannot be im-
posed in the absence of a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837(L)), at 2-3 (January
2015).
13. Portions of this section draw from my prior account of Justice Powell's influence
on securities law, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counter-Revolution in the Federal
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841 (2003), but I have supplemented that account to focus
on the materials from Justice Powell's Dirks file relevant to Newman. The unpublished
materials from that file cited here are available at the law library of the Washington & Lee
University.
14. In re Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket 1401,
1412-13 (Jan. 22, 1981).
15. Id. at 1405.
16. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum for Conference, Dirks v. SEC 1 (Mar.
23, 1983).
17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Powell, J.).
2015]
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The only reference in Chiarella to tippees is in footnote 12. The criti-
cal sentence in this note says:
"The tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role
as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty."
Thus, where the tippee becomes a "participant after the fact," he
shares whatever duty the insider breached by conveying the informa-
tion. This analysis makes Dirks' case easy to decide. His liability de-
pends on a finding that the former Equity Funding employees-of
which Secrist [Dirks' principal source] was only one-who disclosed
the fraud, breached their fiduciary duty to Equity Funding.
But even the SEC concedes there was no such breach of duty.
None of these employees profited by disclosing fraud. They acted
strictly in the public interest. Therefore, Dirks was not a participant
after the fact in anyone's breach of duty.18
Chiarella required a breach of duty; Dirks' sources had violated no duty.
Dirks therefore could not be liable for violating Rule 10b-5.
Powell was not satisfied, however, with merely exonerating Dirks. He
continued:
Deciding this case without identifying a general principle would ac-
complish very little.
Let me make clear the type of situation to which the principle would
be applied. This case does not involve a Texas Gulf Sulfur situation 19
where an officer or director of a corporation himself trades on inside
information for personal gain. Nor do we have an insider-who to
benefit a friend-discloses inside information on which the friend
profits. The law is fairly well settled with respect to these straightfor-
ward cases.
The much broader, underlying problem in this case concerns the ne-
cessity of information being made available for the health of the se-
curities markets. In this case, the SEC's opinion stated:
"In the course of their work, analysts actively seek out bits and
pieces of corporate information not generally known to the market
for the express purpose of analyzing that information and inform-
ing their clients who, in turn, can be expected trade on the basis of
the information. The value to the entire market of these efforts
cannot be gainsaid: market efficiency in practice is significantly en-
hanced by such initiatives to ferret out an[d] analyze information,
and thus the analysts' works redowns [sic] to the benefit of the
investors."
If we sustain its opinion in this case securities analysts will be far less
liable to "ferret out" information. They will be concerned constantly
18. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum for Conference, Dirks v. SEC, supra
note 16, at 1.
19. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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with the uncertainty of lawsuits, with juries determining whether the
information circulated was confidential and should not have been
disclosed.2 0
Breach of a duty of confidentiality was clearly insufficient to allege an
insider trading violation, in Powell's view. Powell proposed an alternative
principle: "[a] tippee's liability should depend on the purpose or intent of
the insider's disclosure." Powell conceded that this was "a subjective
rule," but one he defended as "principled and practical."'' z Powell recog-
nized that the "question of 'purpose' (intent) will be determined-as it is
so often in the law-by the facts." The relevant facts would include
(i) The relationship between the insider and the recipient (e.g., the
analyst); what were their respective purposes? Particularly, did the
insider expect to profit himself or to benefit a friend rather than to
inform the market generally?
(ii) Who initiated the disclosure? Typically, the analyst seeks out the
corporate executive-this is commonplace. Equally commonplace,
executives brief large meeting of analysts. The circumstances of the
disclosure are relevant-as in this case. 22
Powell wanted to leave space for securities professionals to uncover non-
public information, even if it came from corporate insiders. Not having a
ban on tipping was a non-starter for Powell; insiders would trade informa-
tion for cash or give it to the stereotypical golfing buddy. On the other
hand, the SEC could not be trusted to determine the boundaries of legiti-
mate and illegitimate use of inside information. Leaving it to the agency
to draw the line would lead to analysts being completely frozen out.
Powell was able to swing a majority to reverse the SEC, but holding a
court would be a challenge as no consensus rationale emerged from the
conference. 23 The risk that the Dirks majority would fragment was real.
Powell and his law clerk, James Browning, got to work. Browning wrote
to his boss:
We both know Dirks is a freak case. The situations we are concerned
with are where securities analysts interview employees seeking infor-
mation: is there liability? If the breach of an employee's duty alone is
enough to establish tippee liability, securities analyst [sic] will be
chilled from using any of the information he gets. If, on the other
hand, exploitation of confidential information by insiders is a prereq-
20. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum for Conference, Dirks v. SEC, supra
note 16, at 2-3.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id.
23. Justice White's vote, for example, was "tentative," and seemed to be based on the
fact that Dirks "didn't unload," although Justice White thought that "[h]is tippees may be
guilty of violating rules." Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Con-
ference on Dirks v. SEC 1 (Mar. 23, 1983). Justice Stevens, by contrast, thought that "Dirks
breached no duty. Even if he had owned stock + sold it, but [sic] he had no duty. A person
who is an outsider has no duty." Id. at 3. Justice O'Connor thought that "the ultimate
solution is to require fraud to be disclosed first to SEC-would like to say this." Id.
20151
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uisite to tippee liability, securities analysts will be encouraged to seek
information from corporate employees. I will not emphasize the ob-
vious benefits of protecting the information-gathering duties of a se-
curities analyst. 24
Powell agreed that "Dirks is easy, but is there a general principle?" 25 He
wanted to protect analysts in their work without inviting "exploitation"
by insiders.
Browning's first draft, as edited by Powell, formulated this test for tip-
ping liability:
It is first necessary, in order to make out a tipping case against an
insider, to prove that the insider exploited confidential information
in violation of his fiduciary duties to shareholders. Whether disclo-
sure of material nonpublic information is a breach of duty thus de-
pends on the purpose of the disclosure. The tipper will be liable if (i)
he discloses material, nonpublic information to one who trades on
the information and (ii) the purpose of the disclosure was to receive
some benefit in return or to make a gift of the information to the
recipient to enable him to gain a market advantage over other trad-
ers. Similarly, a lOb-5 claim against an alleged tippee must be based
on the theory that he knowingly participated with the insider in ex-
ploiting the confidential information: in essence that he was an aider
and a better [sic]. A recipient of such a tip would be liable if used the
information in connection with securities trading, knowing the pur-
pose of the disclosure.26
Two things jump out from this passage: (1) the insider must be tipping for
the purpose of making a gift; and (2) the tippee must know that this was
the insider's purpose. Indeed, Powell instructed Browning to omit a refer-
ence to the SEC's position that the "tippee need not have actual knowl-
edge of a breach of duty of the tipper. '27 Powell did not "wish to
encourage the Commission to infer knowledge or claim constructive
knowledge on suspicion. '28 If the Dirks opinion had gone to print at this
point, Newman would have been an uncontroversial application of Dirks.
Browning's second draft restated this test with no material changes,
29
but the test subsequently began to evolve. Powell wrote a rider for inser-
tion into the draft opinion, laying out what he saw as the correct analyti-
cal framework. The rider notes that "tipee [sic] must have had 'notice of
the violation of duty." 30 In the accompanying Note to Jim and Myself,
24. Memorandum from Jim [Browning] to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 6-7 (Mar. 22,
1983).
25. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
26. FIRST DRAFT: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 (April 30, 1983), at 24-25 (footnotes
omitted).
27. Memo from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Jim [Browning], 82-276 Dirks v. SEC, at 5 (May
2, 1983).
28. Id. at 6.
29. SECOND DRAFT: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 (May 10, 1983), at 20-21 (footnotes
omitted).
30. Rider A, at 14 (Dirks) (05/14/83) (quoting 3 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
IoN 1451 (1961)).
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Powell confessed to struggling with the issue. Secrist had breached no
duty, which meant that Dirks would be off the hook, but Powell's ambi-
tion for the opinion was broader:
We would like, in addition, to make clear that the typical situation in
which this question may arise is where analysts - in the normal
course of their work - obtain and use confidential information. De-
termining whether the tipper has breached a duty and whether the
tipee [sic] had notice, present two difficult questions. The standard
we propose with respect to the tipper is his purpose or motive - es-
sentially a subjective standard. It will be even more difficult to show
whether or not the tipee [sic] had notice of an improper motive.
These are the questions that make this case so difficult. 31
In a handwritten note in the margin of the memo, commenting on the
appropriate standard of liability, Powell wrote: "I'm not sure the 'scien-
ter' test is applicable. I'll re-read Ernst & Ernst. ' 32 In a separate rider,
Powell grappled with the question of scienter.
It is clear under our Rule 10b-5 cases that liability is imposed only
when one acts with scienter (cite cases). There would be no breach of
duty where corporate executive [sic] inadvertently or even negli-
gently disclosed the information relied upon. The critical question,
therefore is whether there was an intent or purpose to disclose mate-
rial nonpublic information to one who could trade on the informa-
tion to the detriment of shareholders. Ascertaining intention may be
difficult, but this is a familiar question often confronted by courts.
There are facts and circumstances that often justify inferences of
wrongful purpose. For example there may be a relationship exists
[sic] the insiderand [sic] the recipient that a quid pro quo from the
latter, or an intention to benefit the recipient. Also, such inference
may arise where the disclosure was made at the initiative of the in-
sider rather than by the recipient tipee [sic].
Where a breach of fiduciary duty by the insider is established, liabil-
ity may be imposed on the tipee [sic] only when he has notice of such
a breach. See supra, at. Again, this is a question of fact that must
be resolved in light of all relevant circumstances. A securities ana-
lyst, making a study of a particular corporation that includes inter-
views with its officers, acquires information that may form the basis
of a market letter to clients. This is a typical situation, and customa-
rily involves participants who understand their responsibilities and
adhere to them. But there are cases, of course where the facts - and
inferences reasonable [sic] drawn from them - demonstrate the req-
uisite scienter on the part of both the tipper and the tipee [sic]. This
is not such a case. 33
The element of scienter is present here, but in this version of the test it is
not entirely clear how that element maps on to Powell's theory of breach
31. Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Dirks Memo from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (May 14, 1983).
2015]
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of duty. Powell's earlier formulation suggested that the tipping test was
about duty, not state of mind, although motive was relevant to duty. In
this rider, the line between the two elements has been blurred.
34
After Powell's additions, Browning generated a fourth draft with this
formulation of the critical standard: "A tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to
the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic in-
formation only when the insider breaches his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows
of the breach."'35 The fourth draft also contains Powell's "quid pro quo"
and "intention to benefit the recipient" language from the rider quoted
above.36
After receiving the first printed draft of the opinion, Powell added a
new rider that explored the element of the tipper's purpose in greater
detail:
There may be situations where both the insider and the analyst recip-
ient have acted in good faith, and yet release of the information af-
fected markets. Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore
depends in large part on the purpose or good faith of the insider who
made the disclosure. Absent an improper purpose, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders - e.g., a corporate official mistakenly
thinks the information already has been disclosed or that it is not
material enough to affect the market. And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach.
37
Disclosure of material information is clearly insufficient, and improper
purpose is still the touchstone. Powell muddies the waters, however, by
offering an example for which scienter would clearly be lacking. Has the
fiduciary duty not been breached, or is scienter lacking? Or both?
A subsequent change deepens the mystery. The first printed draft car-
ries over the "tippee knows of the breach" phrasing quoted from Brown-
ing's fourth draft above.38 The second printed draft, however, broadens
the standard: "The tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach."'39 The "knows or should know" language is repeated two pages
later.40 The changes are not reflected in Powell's handwritten notes on
the first printed draft, nor are they included in one of his riders. More
puzzling, the memos cited above suggest that Powell favored the require-
ment that the tippee have actual knowledge of the tipper's breach. The
change does make the language in the text more consistent, however,
with the authorities cited in the appended footnote, as well as with the
34. Powell wrote an additional rider, discussing the effect that the SEC's theory would
have on the work of analysts. Rider A, at 26 (Dirks) (May 14, 1983). This rider found its
way into the published opinion largely intact. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59.
35. FOURTH DRAFT: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 (May 20, 1983), at 19-20 (footnote
omitted).
36. Id. at 23.
37. Rider A, at 15 (Dirks) (May 23, 1983).
38. CHAMBERS DRAFT, Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276, at 13 (May 22, 1983).
39. CHAMBERS DRAFT II, Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276, at 13 (May 25, 1983).
40. Id. at 15.
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SEC's prior position.41 Browning's recollection-more than thirty years
after the fact-was that the change was made to make the opinion more
consistent with those authorities as well as the concurring opinion of
Commissioner Smith in In re Investors Management Co.,42 an SEC insider
trading decision heavily relied upon in the Dirks opinion.43 There had
also been discussion in Powell's chambers of hypothetical tippees-wait-
ers and taxicab drivers who overheard material, non-public information
being discussed by corporate insiders-and the proper standard to be ap-
plied to their state of mind. The change was not, however, intended to
depart from the established standard of scienter for Rule 10b-5 violations,
which was taken as a given.44 The distinction was not important to the
decision of the case because the Court concluded that Secrist had not
breached a duty in providing the information to Dirks, so Dirks' knowl-
edge was irrelevant. Nonetheless, this addition would be seized upon by
the SEC-with significant consequences for the law of insider trading in
the Second Circuit-later on.45
Powell's emphasis on "purpose" in determining whether there was a
fiduciary breach proved to be the critical stumbling block in the quest for
a majority. Powell quickly got three votes for his initial circulation (Jus-
tices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens). 46 Justice O'Connor, however, wor-
ried that looking to the insider's improper purpose in disclosing the
information would require:
[T]he fact-finder... to determine the subjective state of mind of the
insider, and liability may be imposed only when the insider has an
improper purpose, or the tippee has some independent duty not to
trade. Although there may be rules of thumb, e.g., the one you sug-
gest concerning relationship between the parties, that are used to
help determine subjective intent, it nevertheless appears that the fo-
cus of the inquiry is subjective motivation. Your focus on subjective
purpose is consistent with, and very much like, your approach in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), although that opin-
ion is not cited in your draft.47
O'Connor found this "an inherently difficult determination to make. It
requires that the tippee 'predict' what is going on in the mind of his tip-
per.''4s O'Connor contrasted the materiality determination, which she
thought manageable for the tippee, with the tippee's ability to assess
41. The footnote made it into the published opinion unchanged. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at
660 n.20.
42. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
43. Telephone Interview with James Browning (May 22, 2015).
44. Id.
45. See text at infra notes 63-88.
46. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice Byron R. White et al. 1 (June 9,
1983).





"whether an insider subjectively possesses a prohibited purpose. ' 49
O'Connor also worried that "the purpose test might prohibit the dissemi-
nation of the information in this case. If Secrist's motivation was proven
to be a desire for vengence [sic] against Equity Funding, and if the SEC
determined that this was a prohibited purpose, Secrist and Dirks would
violate the securities laws."' 50 Powell disagreed.51 O'Connor suggested
that: "[T]he 'purpose' discussion may be omitted without altering your
basic approach." 52 Powell also disagreed with this point.53 O'Connor's al-
ternative nonetheless appealed to Powell:
[W]hether the insider derives a direct or indirect benefit from his
disclosure, and that benefit is primarily of a pecuniary nature. An
emphasis on benefit differs from your approach only insofar as it
establishes a more objective indicia of liability. If, as a factual matter,
the insider did not benefit from his disclosure, then I am not inclined
to be concerned with a further inquiry into his motivation. I am not
sure about what will be gained from an inquiry into intent, but from
my past experience on the bench, I know that a great deal of time
will be lost!54
Without a personal benefit, purpose would be irrelevant, according to
Justice O'Connor, streamlining the inquiry.
Powell incorporated O'Connor's "quite constructive" suggestion into
his standard. 55 Powell made the following changes to accommodate
O'Connor's personal benefit criterion:
Before: both the insider and the analyst will act in good faith
After: the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary duty to
shareholders
Before: Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in
large part on the purpose or good faith of the insider who
made the disclosure. Absent an improper purpose, there has
been no breach of duty to stockholders.
After: Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in
large part on the purpose of the disclosure, i.e., whether the
insider personally expects to benefit, directly or indirectly,
from his disclosure. Absent such purpose, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders.
49. Id. Powell noted his agreement with this statement in the margin. Id. ("I agree")
(handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
50. Id.
51. Id. ("No") (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
52. Id.
53. Id. ("No") (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
54. Id.
55. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 1 (June 9,
1983).
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Added: The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not exist
when the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but
is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when the par-
ties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business
justification for transmitting the information. We think the
SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether the
insider's purpose in making a particular disclosure is fraudu-
lent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read the par-
ties minds. Scienter may be relevant in some case in
determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts
duty, but to determine whether the disclosure itself
"deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]" shareholders, Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), courts should focus on whether
the insider expects to receive a direct or indirect personal ben-
efit from the disclosure, such as-for example-a pecuniary
gain or a reputational benefit that may translate into future
earnings.
Before: Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question of
fact, will not always be easy for the courts.
After: Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy
for courts.
Before: The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for
revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have any
apparent purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable informa-
tion to Dirks.
After: The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for
revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks.56
These changes narrowed the scope of improper purposes that the SEC
could argue constituted breaches of fiduciary duty under Rule 10b-5;
"good faith" was purged. O'Connor's personal benefit standard made
clear that garden variety breaches of the duty of care were clearly out,
including breaches of the duty of confidentiality. As a result, the federal
common law of insider trading was aligned with the traditional distinction
in state corporate law between breaches of care and loyalty; tipping re-
quired a breach of the duty of loyalty.5 7
In adding the personal benefit requirement, Powell did not eliminate
the requirement that the SEC prove the tipper's purpose in disclosing; his
revisions simply narrowed the test to require that the purpose be to gain a
personal benefit by disclosing the information. Moreover, these additions
clarify that the personal benefit requirement is distinct from the question
56. Compare Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., First Draft Opinion, Dirks v. SEC 14-15,
18-19 (May 28, 1983), with Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Second Draft Opinion, Dirks v.
SEC 14-15, 18-19 (June 9, 1983).
57. See also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 n.10 (distinguishing "the duty that insiders owe to
the corporation's shareholders not to trade on inside information... from the common-
law duty that officers and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage
corporate assets, of which confidential information is one").
2015]
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of scienter. The personal benefit test goes to the question of duty, not
state of mind, as evidenced by the reference to scienter in the longest
addition. This distinction perhaps sheds light on the prior shift to "knows
or should know" highlighted above; "should know" is sufficient to
demonstrate participation in a breach of duty by the insider. The govern-
ment, however, must also show the tippee's scienter-an intent to de-
fraud-to satisfy the elements of Rule 10b-5.
O'Connor's change created a more predictable framework-and a nar-
rower prohibition-to achieve Powell's ultimate goal of protecting the
analyst community from being swamped by the prohibition against in-
sider trading. Powell, perhaps suspecting that the SEC would endeavor to
do an end run around the personal benefit requirement, retained the pur-
pose requirement as well. Sending the revised draft to Justices White,
Rehnquist, and Stevens, he assured them that "[t]he reasoning of the
opinion is not changed. Sandra thought my reference to the 'purpose' of
the insider was unnecessarily subjective. She prefers using the more ob-
jective term: 'benefit' to insider, direct or indirect. '58
The last set of changes to Powell's opinion came in response to Justice
Harry Blackmun's dissent. Blackmun raised the issue of scienter:
Of course, an insider is not liable in a Rule 10b-5 administrative ac-
tion unless he has the requisite scienter. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
691 (1980). He must know or intend that his conduct violate his duty.
Secrist obviously knew and intended that Dirks would cause trading
on the inside information and that Equity Funding shareholders
would be harmed. The scienter requirement addresses the intent nec-
essary to support liability; it does not address the motives behind the
intent. 59
Blackmun's conflation of motive and scienter prodded Powell to clarify
the role of scienter in his opinion, emphasizing that scienter and duty
were separate issues. Motive was principally relevant to the latter.
Scienter is some cases is relevant in determining whether the tipper
has violated his Cady, Roberts duty. But to determine whether the
disclosure itself "deceive[s], manipulates[s], or defraud[s]" share-
holders, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 (1980), the initial inquiry is
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. This requires
courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives
a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such a pecu-
niary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
58. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens, re: 82-
276 Dirks v. SEC (June 9, 1983) (citations omitted).
59. Harry A. Blackmun, Xerox Copy of Dissenting Opinion, No. 82-276 - Dirks v.
SEC, at 8 n.10 (June 24, 1983). Justice Blackmun also suggested that "When the disclosure
is to an investment banker or some other adviser, however, there is normally no breach
because the insider does not have scienter: he does not intend that the inside information
be used for trading purposes to the disadvantage of shareholders." Id. at 8 n.11. This sug-
gestion provoked a dismissive "naive" from Powell in the margin of Powell's copy of Black-
mun's dissent, and a note that it was "Contradictory!" of what Blackmun had said in the
passage quoted in the text. Id. at 8 (handwritten notes).
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earnings.60
Deception was the element of Rule 10b-5 to be decided in Dirks, not
state of mind, and without a breach of duty, there could be no deception.
Powell appended a footnote to this passage further sharpening the
distinction.
Scienter - "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud"-is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation.
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, motivation is not irrelevant to
the issue of scienter. It is not enough that an insider's conduct results
in harm to investors; rather, a violation may be found only where
there is "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or de-
fraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of se-
curities." The issue in this case, however, is not whether Secrist or
Dirks acted with scienter, but rather whether there was any deceptive
or fraudulent conduct at all, i.e., whether Secrist's disclosure consti-
tuted a breach of his fiduciary duty and thereby caused injury to
shareholders. Only if there was such a breach did Dirks, a tippee,
acquire a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain.61
Scienter might be relevant in future cases that the SEC might bring, but
Secrist lacked an improper motive-i.e., the desire to gain a personal ben-
efit-which meant that there was no breach of fiduciary duty, and, hence,
no deception. Therefore, the Court had no occasion to inquire into either
Secrist's or Dirks' state of mind.62 In a future case, scienter might be a
dispositive issue, and motive might be relevant to scienter, but the prior
question was deception. That question turned on whether the disclosure
was made with an improper motive, i.e., in exchange for a personal bene-
fit, direct or indirect. The opinion was handed down the following week.
III. OBUS
The SEC was not happy with the constraints imposed on it by Dirks,
and the agency worked hard to loosen those fetters. The agency initially
sought to expand the definition of reputational benefit in ways that can-
not be squared with Dirks.63 The most conspicuous shot across the bow
came in 2000, however, when the SEC adopted Regulation FD, which
prohibits selective disclosures of the sort that Powell sought to protect
with his personal benefit test in Dirks.64 Regulation FD limits selective
60. THIRD DRAFT, Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276, at 17 (June 27, 1983).
61. Id. at 17 n.23 (citations omitted).
62. Another addition to this draft emphasizes that deception is a separate element. Id.
at 20 n.27 ("Moreover, to constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5, there must be fraud. There is
no evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to or did in fact 'deceive or defraud'
anyone.") (citation omitted).
63. SEC v. Stevens, No. 1:91-CV-01869-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1991) (SEC secured a
settlement against a tipper when a CEO allegedly provided material nonpublic information
to an investment analyst with the "hope" that the analyst would issue favorable reports
about the CEO's company in the future).




disclosure by public companies to institutional investors and others in the
financial services industry.65 Notably, Regulation FD was adopted by the
SEC pursuant to its authority to regulate disclosures by public companies.
The rule specifically disclaims defining selective disclosure as fraudu-
lent.66 This is by necessity; under Dirks' personal benefit standard, simple
breaches of confidentiality are not deceptive.
Apart from its rulemaking efforts, the SEC also persuaded lower courts
to adopt broad interpretations of Dirks' personal benefit requirement.
The SEC's efforts to undermine Dirks ultimately culminated with the
Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Obus.67 In Obus, the Second Circuit
rejected the SEC's argument that the Dirks personal benefit test should
not apply in cases asserting a violation of the misappropriation theory
(unlike the classical theory at issue in Dirks).68 That was a minor setback
for the SEC, however, as the Court read Dirks in a manner that was very
generous to the agency, but that generosity to the SEC came at the ex-
pense of fidelity to Justice Powell's opinion in Dirks. The Obus Court laid
out its understanding of the elements for tipper liability:
To be held liable, a tipper must (1) tip (2) material non-public infor-
mation (3) in breach of a fiduciary duty of confidentiality owed to
shareholders (classical theory) or the source of the information (mis-
appropriation theory) (4) for personal benefit to the tipper. The req-
uisite scienter corresponds to the first three of these elements. 69
The last sentence is a non sequitur; nothing in Dirks suggests that the
scienter element does not apply to element of personal benefit, and the
Second Circuit does not cite any authority for that proposition. The Obus
court goes astray because it ignores that the Dirks personal benefit test
requires not just that tippers receive a personal benefit, but that they dis-
close confidential information for the purpose of receiving a personal
benefit.70 The absence of a personal benefit will end that inquiry, but the
presence of one is not dispositive: purpose must still be shown. That pur-
pose requirement necessarily means that the breach of duty and state of
mind inquiries will sometimes overlap: "Scienter in some cases is relevant
in determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts duty. '"71
Dirks does not suggest that the scienter requirement should not apply to
the element of personal benefit, but a disclosure cannot be deceptive
65. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 et seq.
66. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 ("No failure to make a public disclosure required solely by
[Regulation FD] shall be deemed to be violation of Rule lob-5 under the Securities Ex-
change Act.").
67. 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).
68. Id. at 285-86.
69. Id. at 286. Number three appears to be simply wrong; insiders are breaching a duty
of disclosure to shareholders under the classical theory. The insider's duty of confidential-
ity runs to the corporation.
70. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (Insiders "may not give such information to an outsider for
the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.").
71. See id. at 663.
[Vol. 68
Dirks and the Gensis
under Dirks unless a personal benefit was the object of the disclosure.
The duty question is logically prior in the Dirks framework.
Having streamlined the requirements for tipper liability, the Obus
court proceeded to dilute the requirements for tippee liability. The Obus
court quotes Dirks' language that the tippee inherits the insider's duty
only when "the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach, '72 suggesting that it "sounds somewhat similar to a negligence
standard. '73 The history of the personal benefit standard outlined above
demonstrates that Powell was addressing the question of duty, not state
of mind, with that formulation. Tippee liability is derivative of the tipper's
breach of fiduciary duty: "Only if there [is] such a breach [does] a tippee,
acquire a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain."'74 But it is a fiduciary duty
of a particular sort that the tippee is acquiring. The tippee must be shown
to have breached that duty to satisfy the element of deception, a question
separate from the element of scienter. There was no occasion to address
Dirks' state of mind, as Secrist had violated no duty.75 As noted above,
there is no reason to think that the inclusion of the "should know" lan-
guage meant Powell was diluting the scienter element that he had cham-
pioned in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.76 But the Obus court effectively
guts the scienter requirement for tippees. The key move:
We think the best way to reconcile Dirks and Hochfelder in a tipping
situation is to recognize that the two cases were not discussing the
same knowledge requirement when they announced apparently con-
flicting scienter standards. Dirk's [sic] knows or should know stan-
dard pertains to a tippee's knowledge that the tipper breached a
duty, either to his corporation's shareholders (under the classical
theory) or to his principal (under the misappropriation theory), by
relaying confidential information. 77
This is a possible-but scarcely inevitable-reading of "knows or should
know" standard in isolation: "should know" could mean negligence. A
more faithful reconciliation of Dirks and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
however, would require recklessness for the tippee's knowledge of the
personal benefit. As Powell reminds us in Dirks, the elements of duty and
scienter-although distinct-will frequently overlap. The Obus court's
formulation that the tippee can be complicit in the tipper's breach if the
"tippee knew or had reason to know that confidential information was
initially obtained and transmitted improperly (and thus through decep-
tion)" ignores a critical portion of the Dirks personal benefit test.78 The
breach of duty must not only be a breach of confidence, which might be
72. Obus, 693 F.3d at 287 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660).
73. Id.
74. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 n.23.
75. Id.
76. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
77. Obus, 693 F.3d at 288.
78. Id. at 288; see also id. at 292 (holding a breach of duty of confidentiality sufficient
to put tippee on notice of breach of fiduciary duty).
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done negligently: the disclosure must be for the purpose of self-enrich-
ment.79 The Obus court splits the breach of confidentiality from the pur-
pose of receiving a personal benefit, which undercuts Dirks' insistence
that "there is no general duty to forgo market transactions 'based on ma-
terial, nonpublic information."' 80 The Obus court relegates the scienter
inquiry to other elements of the tippee's violation, specifically, the use of
the information. But a court applying Dirks-and Ernst & Ernst-should
separately address whether the tippee acted with scienter in participating
in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty. The breach of fiduciary duty by
the insider is the gravamen of the deceptive conduct. The deception re-
quirement, which goes back to Santa Fe, is the focus of the Dirks test.81
IV. NEWMAN
The impact of the wrong turn in Obus became apparent soon enough.
Newman arose from the criminal prosecution of two hedge fund manag-
ers who were at the end of extended tipping "chains." Through those
chains, the managers received confidential information about impending
earnings releases from public companies. At their trial, the district court,
following Obus, instructed the jury that:
To meet its burden, the [G]overnment must also prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant you are considering knew that the
material, nonpublic information had been disclosed by the insider in
breach of a duty of trust and confidence. The mere receipt of mate-
rial, nonpublic information by a defendant, and even trading on that
information, is not sufficient; he must have known that it was origi-
nally disclosed by the insider in violation of a duty of
confidentiality. 82
The trial court rejected the defendants' request that the jury be charged
that it had to find that the defendants "knew that the corporate insiders
had disclosed confidential information for personal benefit. ' 83
The court of appeals rejected the argument that a breach of confidenti-
ality was sufficient for insider trading. Instead, the Newman court
adopted a more demanding standard for tippee liability:
For purposes of insider trading liability, the insider's disclosure of
confidential information, standing alone, is not a breach. Thus, with-
out establishing that the tippee knows of the personal benefit re-
ceived by the insider in exchange for the disclosure, the government
cannot meet its burden of showing that the tippee knew of a
79. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58 (rejecting SEC's theory of tippee liability based on "a
duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic
information").
80. Id. at 666 n.27 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980)).
81. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1976) (holding that liability
under Rule 10b-5 requires manipulation or deception).
82. Newman, 773 F.3d at 444.
83. Id.
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breach.84
This standard marked a sharp departure from Obus-which allowed tip-
pee liability on a simple showing of awareness of a breach of confidential-
ity-and a return to Dirks' requirement of knowledge of a personal
benefit to the tipper.
The two decisions might be distinguished on the ground that Newman
involved the criminal standard that the defendant acted "willfully," 85 but
the conflict between Newman and Obus on the elements of tippee liabil-
ity-a Rule 10b-5 question-is not so easily reconciled. Newman requires
that the tippee know that the tipper received a personal benefit for dis-
closing confidential information, while Obus requires only that the tipper
know that the tippee was breaching a confidence. Newman is more faith-
ful to Powell's understanding of the personal benefit test and the require-
ment that the tippee be a participant in the insider's fraudulent breach of
fiduciary duty. Dirks is explicit that simply breaching a duty of confidence
does not constitute "deception." How can a tippee be a participant after
the fact in the breach of fiduciary duty if they do not know of the breach?
The Newman court dealt the U.S. Attorney's campaign against insider
trading another blow, however, when it defined "personal benefit." The
mere fact of friendship between a tipper and tippee was not enough;
there had to be "proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. '86 It is
this restrictive definition that provoked the sharp reactions from the U.S.
Attorney and SEC quoted in the introduction. Does the Newman court's
definition of "personal benefit" deviate from Justice Powell's understand-
ing in Dirks?
In my view, this question is a close one. In Dirks, Powell offers as an
example of a personal benefit: "The elements of fiduciary duty and ex-
ploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a
gift of confidential information to trading relative or friend." Powell does
not qualify how close the relative or friend must be. The Justice Depart-
ment and the SEC argue that the absence of a qualifier was deliberate: a
showing of friendship should be enough, and they have found plenty of
lower courts willing to accept that view. 87 The judicial history of Dirks
presented above does not support the government's position. Given that
Secrist had violated no duty, the tippee's required quantum of friendship
with the tipper could be resolved in a later case. The proffered example
was not intended as the ultimate rule. Moreover, Powell had no occasion
to consider the issues created by information passing along an extended
84. Id. at 448.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
86. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
87. See, e.g., SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (disclosure by tipper to
dentist conferred personal benefit). But see SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (S.D.
Ohio 2004) (tip to tipper's barber did not meet personal benefit requirement).
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chain before being traded on. It was not raised by the facts in Dirks, and
there is nothing in Powell's file that would suggest that an extended chain
of information was considered.
The stronger counter-argument to the government's position-that
only a minimal relationship is required-is that the personal benefit ele-
ment requires the government to prove that the tipping insider disclosed
the information for the purpose of receiving a personal benefit, direct or
indirect. Would the existence of a casual friendship or acquaintance war-
rant the inference that the insider breached a duty of confidentiality for
the purpose of bestowing a gift? That seems like more of a stretch than
passing the information on to a sibling, or one's child, where we might be
willing to draw an inference of an indirect personal benefit to the tipper
in most cases. Even in that context, the casual way that some corporate
executives bandy about confidential corporate information in their own
homes should give us pause before drawing an inference of deception. 88
The concern becomes more acute in a criminal context, where Newman's
holding is likely to have the most traction.
Powell crafted his opinion carefully to exclude careless breaches, and
Newman construed personal benefit in light of that goal. The test requires
the purpose to make a gift, and although some people may be committing
random acts of kindness when they bestow information on a stranger, it
seems much more likely that they have been careless in disclosing. To
phrase it differently, the gift needs to be exploitation, not waste (the cor-
porate law term for a hypothetical gift to a stranger). Giving away corpo-
rate information to strangers might make you feel like a big shot, but the
standard is self-dealing: the gift needs to be an indirect personal benefit,
which suggests a close relationship, not a casual one. Tying the gift prong
to the presence of a friend or relative-and requiring the government to
satisfy a non-trivial quantum of proof with respect to that relationship-
restricts the SEC from coming up with strained theories of gifting by in-
siders. Powell was very much worried about the SEC's penchant for novel
theories, and the primary purpose of the personal benefit standard in
Dirks is to fence the agency in. Newman's interpretation of personal ben-
efit is consistent with, if not compelled by, Powell's purpose in Dirks.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued in this essay that the evolution of Dirks' personal benefit
standard supports the reasoning of Newman and undercuts the approach
in Obus. That conclusion, however, is based not only on the published
opinion in Dirks, but also the "judicial history" that led to that opinion.
How much legal weight does that judicial history deserve? The conven-
88. SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006) (CEO shared information with wife
about failed drug trial).
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tional answer is none. 89 Some arguments against the use of legislative
history-the text was what was voted on, presentment, etc.-do not quite
fit to judicial history. There are only nine voters in this context, and the
evolution of the personal benefit standard from the justices' initial con-
ference in Dirks to joining Powell's final opinion was transparent. Powell
told his fellow justices what he was doing and why: he was promulgating a
rule to constrain the SEC. On the other hand, a commitment to the rule
of law would seem to support the notion that the published opinion is the
law. That would certainly be the expectation of both Powell and his col-
leagues. And what effect would reliance on judicial history have on the
internal deliberations of the justices?90
These are weighty reasons for a court to ignore judicial history of the
sort presented here when deciding a case that requires the application of
precedent. But the claim of the U.S. Attorney and the SEC that Newman
conflicts with Dirks does not hold up when assessed against this judicial
history. Should such claims go unchallenged? Hard question, particularly
in a criminal case in which the defendants have narrowly escaped doing
hard time.
89. See Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1313 (1999) ("Federal
courts do not consider the judiciary's internal records as interpretive sources bearing on
the meaning of published opinions or judicially-promulgated rules." (citations omitted)).
90. Id. at 1316 ("Resort to judicial history would distort the Court's internal delibera-
tions, render the history unreliable, and undermine various rule of law norms associated
with judicial decisionmaking.").
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